

Islamic Political Thought in Medieval Period

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Abstract: This paper discusses the political theories presented by the eminent Muslim thinkers of the medieval period. These thinkers seem to be under the pressure from the existing regime to provide a justification for the prevalent political system on some scriptural, or at least religious, grounds. Some of the thinkers appear to be under the influence of the Greek philosophy. Among all these thinkers only Ibn Taymiya based his theory on scriptures, namely Quran and Hadith.

Introduction: The Political thought among Muslims started to develop, though vague, right from the Prophets migration to Medina but it was so much intermingled with the religion that it was almost impossible to distinguish between spiritual and political. During, the orthodox caliphate period also the same condition prevails as the caliphs were both, the religious as well political heads. However, by the end of 3rd century after Hijrah, caliph's position in religious arena weakened considerably and they require some justification for their position political head of the Muslim community on religious grounds. The need of the hour developed several theories by the intelligentsia of the period. Some of such theories have discussed, in brief, here.

Main content

Advent of the Islam and the Islamic State in the faraway lands of Asia and Europe and translation of the intellectual material of these countries into Arabic brought some new and strange elements, such as logic, philosophy, metaphysics, into the realms of the Muslim knowledge. These new elements, especially the Greek and Roman philosophy, influenced the Muslim intellectuals, in general. An attempt is being made to present the political ideology of such eminent philosophers and thinkers of the early and medieval Islam.

Al Farabi:

Al Farabi (258/870-339/950), preoccupied with the Greek philosophy on one hand and the Islamic ideals on the other, tried his best to synthesise Plato-Aristotelian philosophy and Islamic tenets. He, following Plato, began his theory with the analysis of human nature. According to him people differ in their physical strength and intellectual capacity; hence, the Imam must be the most capable in all the virtues of humankind; he must be self reliant in all fields and possesses excellence in sciences and arts.

Al Farabi, under the profound influence of Plato, had a concept of *Madinat-ul-Fadhilah*, namely Ideal State. It is the excellent and perfect state while as there may be imperfect states also viz. *Madinat-ul-Fasiqah*, *Madinat-ul-Jahilah* and *Madinat-ul-Dhallah*, i.e. the evil doing state, the state of ignorance and astray-going state, respectively in their imperfection. These remind the Aristotle's classification of states.

Madinat-ul-Fadhilah will be the state administered by the best and most talented one; he must aim at the prosperity and happiness for all the residents of the state. The Imam, chief of this state will preside in all fields of life. He must be excellent and perfect in his profession to achieve the highest happiness in the state. He will not be subservient to any one. He must be in possession of the following twelve characteristics:

1. Sound health and perfect organs.
2. Intelligence and sagacity.
3. Good memory.
4. Prudence and talent.
5. Eloquence.
6. Devotion to education and learning.
7. No greed for food, drink, play, and sex.
8. Friendliness towards truth and truthful persons.
9. Vastness of heart, loving nobility, and natural magnanimity without meanness.
10. Indifference to wealth.
11. Devotion by nature to justice and just people.
12. Strong resolution, courage, and promptitude without any sign of fear.

If the people could not find any one of these qualities, the laws promulgated by the former chief should be kept in force. The second chief who succeeds the first should fulfil at least the following six qualities. He must be:

1. Wise and philosophical;
2. Learned man;
3. Expert in deduction of laws when not available in *Shari'a*;
4. Farsightedness;
5. Well experienced and eloquent in enforcement of *Shari'a*;
6. Physically suitable for, and skilled in, warfare.

The sovereign will be called as *Imam-us-Sunnah*, the chief of tradition, and the state as *Muluk-us-Sunnah*, the country of tradition. The sovereigns of the ideal state who succeed one after another will be all like one soul as if there were one king who continued all the time. The people of the ideal state must have something common in their learning and acting though different groups of people may have some sciences and deeds peculiar to them. They achieve happiness through both of these qualities.

The rulers of imperfect states, in quite contrast to the above, lack the above qualities of the ideal state. Both, the rulers and the ruled, in the evil-doing states are like weeds in a field. They would be like savages and could have no organisation worthy of a State.¹

Although, the ideal state of al Farabi is derived from Plato but the main difference between the two is that the Platonic State was limited to a city while the Farabi's *Madinat-ul-Fadhila* may be international and global-state in character.

Al Mawardi:

The main concern of Al Mawardi (364/974-450/1058) was to assert the authority of Abbasid caliph against the Buwaihid Amirs and provide theological justification to their regime. His treatise, *Al Ahkam-us-Sultaniya*, was intended to demarcate the spheres of authority between the caliph (the religious head) and the Amir (head of secular administration) on the basis of a negotiated agreement. However, he disallowed, in contrast to al Baghdadi, simultaneous existence of two caliphs.

Mawardi insists that the necessity of Imamate arises on the basis of the Ordains of the Allah given in Qur'an, chapter IV, verse 64.² According to him Imamate is established to replace prophecy in the defence of the faith and the administration of the world and it is demanded by *shar'* itself. This statement is directed against the Mu'tazilite as well as philosophers like al Farabi, who derived the state from the reason. He has drawn a distinction between 'government based on reason' and 'government based on revealed law'. He gives preference to the latter and regard it as the higher form. In his view the earlier provides protection merely against mutual injustice and anarchy while as the second provides positive enforcement of law and justice in mutual confidence and friendship in this world and prepares the man for the world hereafter.

Al Mawardi, like al Baghdadi, insists on the election of the Caliph by the *Ash haab ul Hall wal Aqd*, the qualified electors, but he accepted the nomination of a successor by the ruling Imam, for instance, of a son by his father. The electors must possess *Adala*, justice. According to him, the Imamate can be established by a contract between two parties namely, *Imam* and the *jama'*, i.e. the ruler and the ruled ones. *Ijma'*, the consensus, is required to conclude the contract and it can be concluded only after the *bai't*, the investiture, by the qualified electors.

If a contract is concluded and a caliph assumed the office he can not be replaced even by a man more worthy than him, unless he forfeits the Imamate by loss of freedom. The loss of freedom can happen in either of two ways, viz. he may be captivated, thus become unable to exercise his functions, and second, an Amir may seize his effective power and may place him under restraints. In the latter case the preferable candidate must appear on the scene after the investiture and the contract between *Imam* and *Jama'* (the Leader and the People) have taken place again.

Al Mawardi regarded the nomination by the out going Caliph as an equally legitimate method. He justified it on the historical precedents of Abu Bakr's nomination of Omar and Osman's succession to Omar. He regarded appointment of 'six candidates to choose from them' by Omar as nomination, while as all other jurists regarded it as election. By these two precedents he tried to legitimise the hereditary transfer of power within the Abbasids dynasty, whose interests he intended to promote. He, to further their interests, insisted that it is a religious obligation upon the out-going caliph to nominate his successor. He, to justify the above method, introduced a new element namely *Masalih Amma*, i.e. the public welfare, into the theory of Caliphate. He, on the basis of nomination of three successive generals by the Prophet during a war deduced the provision to designate three successive heirs. In order to legitimise Al Mansur's act of replacement of his predecessor's successive nominees by his own appointees Mawardi has provided the first successor with the power to cancel his predecessor's nominees after assuming office.

The principle of election is affirmed only when the out-going caliph appointed two successors without assigning priority to any one of them and this can be happened only after the death of the present caliph.

Al Mawardi assigned ten principal duties to Caliph, viz.

1. Protection of the faith;
2. Provision of justice;
3. Protection of the territory of the Islamic State;
4. Enforcements of punishments as ordained by God Almighty;
5. Waging Jihad against those who invited to Islam but refused to accept it or to pay *jizya*;
6. Just distribution of booty;
7. Charity;
8. Maintenance of state-finance in appropriate manner;
9. Selection and appointment of competent officials;
10. Personal supervision to the public affairs.

Finally, Mawardi discusses the conditions for the effective maintenance of the Imamate and the valid grounds for its forfeiture. According to him, Imam forfeits his authority if he lost physical or mental fitness. Here, he stressed upon the Caliph's ability to interpret the faith correctly and to maintain his freedom. Again, contemporary situation is responsible for this detailed and precise exposition.³

¹Muhammad Saghar Hasan Al Ma'sumi, "Al Farabi", in M. M. Sharif. ed., *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, in 2 vols, Otto Harrasowitz, Weisbaden, 1963, vol. I., pp. 707-717.

²"We sent; no messenger save that he should be obeyed by Allah's leave. And if, when they had wronged themselves, they had but come unto thee and asked forgiveness of Allah and asked forgiveness of the messenger, they would have found Allah Forgiving, Merciful"(4:64)

³E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, pp. 27-37.

Nizam ul Mulk Tusi:

Nizam-ul-Mulk Tûsi (408/1018-485/1092) was the product of a tumultuous period that witnessed the decadence of the Caliphate to its lowest profile. In his times it degraded to puppetry in the hands of powerful emirs. He, fortunately, got appointment as *Vizier*, the prime minister by a Seljuk Amir, Alp Arslan. Hence, he devoted his attention to provide a theoretical basis and working model to this office that lacks precedence. He selected novel institutions and non-traditional subject matters, *Sultan* and *Vizier*, for his political treatise, *Wasaya*, and developed the theories of *Sultanate* and *Vizierate*, i.e. the kingdom and the ministry respectively.

Though, he was not the first one to discuss the above institutions but certainly he was the first to apply a realistic approach, while the previous writers stuck to the legal one. He realised that it was the independent rule of *Sultan*, i.e. the de facto emir, and not that of the Abbasids Caliph, under whose rule the people had actually been living; and that the Caliph by legitimising the authority of *Sultan* only recognised his *de facto* sovereignty *ipso facto*, hence, this practice did not render him subordinate to the Caliph. His political theory represents a particular phase of development of the Muslim polity in which the powerful emirs seized the authority of Caliph and made the latter a puppet.

Tusi, in his political discussions, consciously avoided any reference to the Caliph as the *de jure* head of the Muslim community and always mentioned his master as *Padshah*; thereby he avoided discussion regarding the legal relations of the Caliph and the Sultan. He, at the instance of the Seljuk ruler Malik Shah, compiled *Siyasat Namah*. His main concern was to assert his master's claim to sovereignty and to counter the Mawardi's *Ahkam-us-Sultaniyah* that had been written at the instance of the Abbasids Caliph to vindicate his claim to sovereignty. This indicates a theoretical conflict between the powers of the Caliph and the Sultan.

Tusi presented the theory of Divine Right of Kings to assert the independent position of his master. The Caliph, under this theory, was no longer the real source of authority as it was transferred to the Divine directly, in first place and next to the ability of the imposter. He, in his *Siyasat Namah*, presents:

“In every age God selects one from the mankind and adorns him with princely skills, and entrusts him with the affairs of the world and the comfort of the subjects”.⁴

He, further, justified not only the usurpation of the authority but the despotism and bloodshed of the kings over the subjects, as he regarded it as the punishment of their (subjects) misdeeds. He says:

“Due to their sin they bring this wrath upon themselves. Benevolent kings disappear from amongst them. Swords are drawn and bloodshed follows; and whosoever is powerful does as he pleases, till the sinners are perished in those calamities and bloodshed.---Ultimately, power goes to one of the people whom God by His grace blesses with success according to his worth, and endows with wisdom and knowledge”.⁵

He was equally emphatic on the principle of the hereditary kingship. The kingly office, for him, is essentially of Divine Origin as well as hereditary and should pass from father to son. Thus, he justified the claims of the Seljuk Sultans for the sovereignty on a three-fold basis, namely, the divine sanction, the conquest by power, and the hereditary succession.

He dealt with the question of obedience to the royal authority with the same point of view, namely divine origin of kingship. According to him, it is obligatory to worship the Almighty, and to obey the king since He appointed him. He consciously avoided the question of obedience to an unjust king, as his aim was to provide legitimacy to the absolute monarchy without any human restrictions. He never bothered to provide a rational or theological justification to any of his argument. For him, Monarch was the sovereign authority in his realm and source of all political power; all are subordinates to him and he is accountable to none, save God.

He, after providing the justification for his master's office, turned towards his own, *vizierate*. He was primarily, rather exclusively concerned with the political and moral aspect of this office. *Vizierate* to him was the most important and the most exalted office, next only to the sultanate. According to him ‘it is the institution on which the religion and the kingdom, the state and the people depend’. He regarded it as an indispensable part in the machinery of a monarchical government. He argued:

“All the Kings who have left their good names in the pages of time, owe it to the felicity of the righteous vizier.-----A good vizier brings to the king a good name and leads him to adopt a good conduct. All the princes who had been great, and whose name shall be held in honour till the Day of Judgment, were those who had good ministers”.⁶

Throughout his argument he attempted to show that the vizier was actually responsible to Sultan for the entire administration, that is to say he is a share holder in the Sultan's real power. He not only exalted the office but also enumerated the dangers in having it. According to him there are at least five dangers, viz. injustice due to overburdening of work; pleasure of one and displeasure of many; incurring the displeasure of the royal house hold, and consequently of the king; hostility of nobles, grandees and courtiers; dependence upon the large number of officials whose conspiracy and lethargy undermine his reputation. He advised the vizier to overcome these dangers by showing due regards for the companions, courtiers, other favourites of the king and the nobles and high officials of the kingdom. The duties of vizier, according to him, are determined by the four-fold relations: First, he is under the obligation of obedience to God; secondly, he owes allegiance to his royal master; thirdly, he has to care for the favorites of the king; and fourthly, he is concerned with the common people.

In brief, Tusi, attempted to present the *vizierate* as a responsible and delicate office, requiring a man of sharp intellect and outstanding abilities.

⁴M. Ruknuddin Hasan, “Nizam al Mulk Tusi”, in M. M. Sharif, vol. I., p. 756.

⁵*Ibid*, vol. I, p. 756.

⁶*Ibid*, vol. I. p. 770.

Al Ghazali :

Al Ghazali's (450/1058-505/1111) theory of Imamate manifests the gulf between the theory of ideal caliphate based on the *Shara'* and the political realities of the Abbasid caliphate dominated by the Seljuk Sultans. It also represents the transformation from idealism to realism. It must be understood against the background of contemporary political and religious controversies and struggles.

In his early treaty, *Kitab-ul Iqtesad fil I'tiqad*, he insisted Imama in its ideal form while as *Kitab-ul-Mustazhiri* is tempered with political realism and readiness to make concessions to the ground realities. Later, in his *Ihya-ul-'Uloom* he, in his attempt to preserve the caliphate as the symbol of unity, surrendered to the actual power of the Seljuq-sultans.

Al Ghazali, like al Mawardi, insisted that Imama is based upon Shariah, not reason; hence, he opposed philosophers' attempt to examine it by the yard-stick of Greek philosophy. He his view it is an indispensable institution of the Muslim life directed by the *Ijma'*. Moreover, it is necessary too as it is advantageous and keeps the damage away in the world. In fact, the good order of the religion is depend upon the good order of the world, which is possible only in presence of an Imam who is obeyed by the people. He used the word Sultan to denote the *Imama*. He quoted the *Hadith* that 'religion and politics are twins' and *din*, religion is foundation and sultan, power is the guardian. Here, in his theory, he stressed on power. He writes that it is significant though mere a mean to a very important end namely, good order of religion with *sadat-ul-akhira*, i.e. ultimate happiness.

He, like al Mawardi, enumerated the virtues of Imam by which he distinguishes himself among the other philosophers. However, he modified these virtues to suit the contemporary political situation and to the then-ruler, al Mustazhiri. For instance, prowess and courage has always been considered as necessary virtues of the Caliph, but Ghazali explained its absence pointing to the *shawka*, the power of Seljuk sultans, which guarantees prowess to the Caliph. Similarly he disposed off the awkward condition of *kifaya*, the competence to discharge the duties of governance, by stating that this condition is fulfilled as long as the Caliph is supported by competent *veziers*. He also treated the '*ilm* in the similar fashion. He introduced *wara'*, fear of God, piety and refraining from dubious practices, public concern and importance to the religion and politics, to compensate the lack of these virtues.

He provided legitimacy to the institution of Sultan by introducing the concept of delegation of the authority from the Caliph to the possessor of *shawkah*, the real temporal power. However, the ultimate responsibility lies with the Caliph. Ghazali, ultimately made the Caliph as one to whom the wielder of force gives his allegiance and confined the Caliph to the religious duties.

Further, he astonishingly accredited an existing practice of designating the Caliph by the Sultan, the *de facto* ruler.⁷

Ibn Jama'a:

Ibn Jama'a (639/1241-733/1333) further developed the Al Ghazali's views and taken them much nearer to realism. He justified the Imama on the authority of Qur'an, chapter XXXVIII, verse 26 and chapter XXII, verse 41. He regarded it a religious necessity and God's Grace. He styled the ruler as *Zil ul Allahi fil Ardh*, i.e. the shadow of God on earth. He ordained, following the opinion of his Imam, Shafi'i, as well as of Ahmad b. Hanbal, that forty years of tyranny of an unjust ruler is better than the abandonment of his subjects for one hour.

He, listing the methods of installing a Caliph, includes nomination by the outgoing Caliph as an appropriate method. He, like al Ghazali, described three methods of installation of caliph viz. election, designation / nomination, and forceful seizure, but in the third category he had gone beyond al Ghazali's designation of a Caliph by *de facto* ruler and includes usurpation of the Caliphate by a powerful military leader in the list. In other words, investiture-by compulsion (*bai't-e-Ikrah*) after seizing the power, designation, and usurpation, all three methods are equally appropriate to establish the authority of Caliph and there is no need of a contract. The people are bound to obey the Caliph under the ordain of the Qur'an:

"Obey Allah, his messenger and those who are in authority".⁸

He has taken the above verse to mean that God coupled the duty of obedience to those who are in authority with that to Him and his Prophet. He added '*ulama* also in this list under the guise of 'those who are in authority'. Hence, *bai't* under coercion is lawful and required obedience. He actually ruled that any usurper can acquire legitimacy and become a *de jure* Imam by a forceful *bai't*. By letting the king-maker make himself as king he come to an end of the way on which al Ghazali was already far advanced. Further, following the line of Tusi, he legitimised the delegation of the authority to the sultans or viziers by declaring it as a necessity and 'custom of our times'. Ibn Jama'a, like Al Mawardi, distinguished between *tafweedh* and *tanfidh* namely, vizirate of delegation and execution. The former implies independent conduct of all affairs of state guided by his own *ra'y* and *ijtihad*. Hence, he must have the same qualification as the Caliph himself, except Quraishite descent. He provided the Caliph with the power to approve or disapprove vizier's actions in the light of his own *ra'y* and *ijtihad*. The vizier of the second kind, on the other hand, is merely executing the orders of the sovereign without any independence.⁹

Ibn Taymiah:

Ibn Taymiah (661/1263-728/1328), in quite contrast to the above mentioned thinkers from Al Farabi to Ibn Jama'a, at once clung to the idealism of Shari'a, but with an accommodation to the political realities. He tried to escape from the vicious circle of Philosophy and reasoning in which the Muslim thinkers of his period were caught, by concentrating on Shari'a and its application to the life with the religious fervour and the reforming zeal of Hanbalism.

Ibn Taymiah deduced the State from the nature of Islam, and thus, reduced the importance of the State. According to him, the 'nature of Islam' demands that there must be an organised social order where it may function properly. When the necessity of state is proved it is better to accept the authority of Allah and his Prophet as Allah orders good and forbids evil. Acceptance of all this, he holds, is obligatory upon the Mankind and these functions cannot be realised without power and authority.

⁷E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 38-43.

⁸Al Qur'an, Ch. IV, ver. 59.

⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 43-51.

He insisted upon the necessity of the authority and order, against the disorder and chaos, to the extent that 'the sovereign is the shadow of God on earth and sixty years under a tyrant Imam are better than a night without Imam'.¹⁰ This statement shows that he shares his Imam, Ahmad b. Hanbal's opinion who opposed resistance even against a tyrant ruler. In fact, Ibn Taymiah preferred stability and welfare of the community to the legitimacy and legality. He did not care whether the Imam is legal or illegal but reform of individual and communal life. He dispensed with the election and even the designation of the Caliph. According to him God designates the Imam through the infallible voice of the *ijma'*. In his theory, the centre of gravity has shifted from the *Khilafa* and *Khalifa* to the *ummah*, the community. He did not insist on ideal qualifications of the Imam. In fact, he never discussed them at all. He ignored the problem of the legitimacy of incumbent in Caliphate altogether.¹¹

However, in *Minhaj*, he discussed Caliph's qualifications; these are:

1. He should be a Quraishite.
2. He should be appointed by the Consultation of the Muslims.
3. He should receive the oath of allegiance from the Muslims.
4. He should possess the quality of justice.¹²

He equally stressed upon the point that state is not a constituent of religion but a matter of practical necessity and instrument to help the cause of religion. He further stressed that the Prophet founded a state; but his regime was *Nubuwwah* (the Prophecy) not *Imamat* (the State), and he was only a Prophet not a ruler. Imamate, though not a constituent part of the faith, became one of the main functions of the Prophet in his later life and it is not external to Prophecy but inscribed and inherent in it. Further, it came into being only after the death of Prophet.¹³ In fact, his main concern was to refute the Shiite theory of Imamate and for the reason he made his theory of State a blend of confusion and contradiction.

For him, Islam is not merely a set of rituals but a complete way of life that can not be followed in absence of authority. Hence, he suggested the Muslims living as minorities that they must endeavour to become numerically superior to capture power.

Ibn Taymiah discussing the theory of *jihad*, observed that there are two things, Qur'an and sword that sustain the religion. He elaborated the idea further: "it is mentioned in a tradition that when a sin is hidden it harms only the person who commit it. But if it is open and is not condemned, it does universal harm. That is why that Shari'a has enjoined war against the infidels. However, it is not obligatory until preparations have been made to fight against them."¹⁴

One can find inconsistency in his theory as he insists upon the importance of the state on one hand and undermines its importance on the other by declaring that it is not a major issue in Islam. This is the consequence of his two equally important concerns namely, refuting the Shiite theory of Imamate that regards the Imamate / Caliphate as the foremost and fundamental issue of Islam, and on the other hand, stressing upon the necessity of state to enforce the Islam in toto.

Ibn Khalladun:

Ibn Khalladun presented the sociological theory of the Caliphate. He adopted a sociological approach to tackle the problem of authority in the Muslim polity, in particular and humanity in general. *Khalifa*, for him, was the choicest fruit of a God-guided and God-centred human association; it is the ideal way to the attainment of happiness in this world and hereafter. He was more concerned with Muslim society than individual Muslims. According to him the human civilisation certainly needs a state by which its affairs can be arranged in proper order.

Ibn Khalladun enumerates three kinds of states on the dual basis of government and purpose, viz. *Siyasa-e-Diniya*, i.e. government based on the Divine-Laws; *Siyasa-e-Aqliya*, i.e. government based on the law established by human reasoning; and *Siyasa-e-Madaniya*, i.e. government of the ideal state of the philosophers. According to him, the first is advantageous in this world as well as hereafter, since the legislators know what is appropriate for them and how they could get salvation hereafter. In contrast, the advantages of the second are limited merely to this world. The third, being an ideal society of the philosophers, does not require the government at all.

According to Ibn Khalladun, the Prophet was a lawgiver as well as a ruler while as the Caliph is his vicegerent, successor and ruler under the Sharia. He distinguished between the *Khilafat* and *Mulukiat* on the basis of their ultimate ends, viz. 'the welfare of the people' and 'the advantage of the ruler', respectively, though the primary source of the statutes of both may be Shari'a. However, he did not condemn this transformation, since it also serves the primary purposes of the state namely, protection of life and property. It was, for him, a natural consequence of the transformation in the psychological conditions of the people. The decline of religious knowledge strengthened the temporal component of the *Khilafa* and inevitably led to the transformation into the *Mulukiat* of the Muawia and the Umayyads.

Conclusion:

Thus, the Islamic political theory in the above periods gradually descends from idealism to realism. Imam Hussain, by rising against the illicit authority of the usurper, Yazid, proved himself the icon of the idealism. Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Malik, on the other hand, expressing their theory that resistance against an impostor is an obligation but with the condition of hope for success, represented the idealism with a precaution to the realistic situations of their times. Qadhi Abu Yusuf began with a purely realistic approach that followed later, passing through Shafi'i, Ahmad b. Hanbal, Ibn Taymiyya, Al Ghazali, etc. culminated into Al Mawardi's theory of Caliphate, Tusi and Ibn Jama'a's theories of *Sultanate* and *Vizierate*.

Qadhi Abu Yusuf tried to revert, by means of persuasion, to the glory of the idealistic orthodox caliphate with exception to the method of establishment of caliphate, while as Shafi'i and Ahmad b. Hanbal and later Ibn Taymia, advocated to accept the established authority as legitimate without bothering how it originated as they were more concerned with maintenance of peace and stability than the legitimacy of the incumbent in caliphate.

¹⁰Prof., Qamaruddin. *The Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyah*, pp. 27-36.

¹¹E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Op. cit.*, pp. 51-53

¹²*Ibid*, p 84

¹³ Prof., Qamaruddin. *Op. cit.*, pp. 62-63

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 37

Al Ghazali and Al Mawardi, on the other hand, tried to legitimise the Abbasids Caliphate, against the Fatimids and Buwahidids respectively, while as Tusi aimed at asserting the sovereignty of his Seljuk master against the claims of Abbasids caliphs. Al Ghazali, went a step further and introduced a new way of installing the Caliph that is nomination by the Sultan or emir holding the *de facto* power.¹⁵

Ibn Jama'a (1241-1333), following the same line of realism, enumerated usurpation of the office through force as the third legitimate method of assuming Caliphate.¹⁶ Al Farabi and Ibn Khalladun stand aloof by representing philosophical and sociological approaches respectively.

As the Islam entered into India during medieval period, it was characterised by many of the above features. Further, some additional elements crept into Indian Muslim thought due to the peculiar Indian socio-political phenomenon.



¹⁵E. I. J. Rosenthal, *op cit*, p. 42.

¹⁶*Ibid*, 45.